














By the eighteenth century, Europeans dominated the military technology of gunpowder 
weapons.  Their dominance was surprising, because the technology had originated in 
China and had been used with expertise in East and South Asia and the Ottoman Empire.  
Historians have often invoked competition to account for the Europeans’ military 
prowess, but competition cannot explain why they forged ahead in developing this 
technology.  The answer lies in the peculiar form that military competition took in 
western Europe: it was a tournament that induced European rulers to invest heavily in 
improving the technology of gunpowder weapons.  Political incentives and military 
conditions kept such a tournament from developing in China, Japan, India, and the 
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 In recent years, historians, economists, and other social scientists have 
energetically debated when Western Europe first forged ahead of other parts of the 
world–in particular, advanced parts of Asia–in the race toward economic development.  
Was it only after 1800, with the Industrial Revolution well underway, that Western 
European per-capita incomes, labor productivity, or technology diverged?  Or was it 
earlier, before the Industrial Revolution?  And what was the cause of the divergence?  
Was it beneficial institutions, which stimulated investment and the accumulation of 
human and physical capital?    The evolution of cultural practices that encouraged hard 
work and education?  The Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, which spread 
useful knowledge and political reform?  Or was it simply an accident that the Industrial 
Revolution started in Western Europe?1 
 In this debate, one area in which Western Europe possessed an undeniable 
comparative advantage well before 1800 seems to have been overlooked–namely, 
violence.  The states of Western Europe were simply better at making and using artillery, 
firearms, fortifications, and armed ships than other advanced parts of the world and they 
had this advantage long before 1800.  By 1800, Europeans had conquered some 35 
percent of the globe, and they controlled lucrative trade routes as far away as Asia.2  
Some of the land they subjugated had come into their hands because of new diseases that 
they introduced into vulnerable populations, and in these instances–in the Americas in 
particular–their advantage was not military, but biological.3  But other inhabitants of 
densely populated parts of Eurasia would have had the same biological edge.  Why was it 
therefore the Western Europeans who took over the Americas, and not the Chinese or the 
Japanese? 
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 The history of conquest is not the only evidence for Western Europe’s military 
advantage before 1800.  States elsewhere–China, Japan, and the Ottoman Empire–
certainly possessed firearms or ships equipped with artillery, but by the late seventeenth 
century, if not before, nearly all of them had fallen behind in using this technology, which 
we will label the “gunpowder technology.”  The case of the Ottoman Empire is 
illustrative.  There the military gap may reach back as far as 1572, when Venetian cannon 
founders judged that guns captured during the naval battle at Lepanto were simply not 
worth reusing.  The Ottoman cannons had to be melted down–and new metal had to be 
added to the mixture–because “the material is of such poor quality.”4.   At a time when 
the high cost of manufactured goods meant everything was salvaged—even clothing from 
fallen comrades—that amounts to strong evidence from revealed preference about how 
much better Western European weapons had become.  The history of trade and the 
migration of military experts points in the same direction.  Although the Ottomans had a 
“robust ordnance industry” and could threaten Vienna as late as 1683, they did import 
weapons from western Europe and often relied on the expertise of European military 
specialists5. 
 The Ottoman Empire was hardly exceptional.  From the Middle East to East Asia, 
experts from Western Europe were hired throughout Asia to provide needed help with 
gun making, tactics, and military organization.  They ranged from renegade European 
gun founders in the sixteenth century to Napoleonic officers the early 1800s.  In 
seventeenth-century China, even Jesuit missionaries were pressed into service to help the 
Chinese Emperor make better cannons.  The evidence for Western Europe’s military 
prowess is so strong that it has even convinced some of the historians who argue against 
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any divergence between Western Europe and advanced areas of China before 1800.  
Although they would argue that Western Europe was not wealthier or more developed 
than rich areas of China, they would acknowledge that its military technology was more 
advanced.6  
 The evidence is thus fairly clear, but it is nonetheless surprising that western 
Europe had come to dominate this technology of gunpowder weapons so early.  Firearms 
and gunpowder, after all, had originated in China and spread throughout Eurasia.  States 
outside Western Europe possessed the revolutionary weapons and did become, at least for 
a while, proficient at manufacturing or exploiting the new military technology.  The 
Ottomans, for instance, long made high quality artillery—perhaps as late as the 1700s.7  
The Japanese discovered—some twenty years earlier than Western Europeans—the key 
tactical innovation (volley fire) that allowed infantry soldiers with slow loading muskets 
to maintain a nearly continuous round of fire.8  Yet by the late seventeenth century, if not 
before, Chinese, Japanese, and Ottoman military technology and tactics all lagged  
behind what one found in western Europe.9 
 Why did these other powerful states fall behind?  A number of gifted military 
historians have worked on the topic, but most simply describe the Europeans’ 
proficiency, without unearthing its underlying causes.  The closest they come to a deeper 
explanation  is the claim that military competition in Europe gave the Europeans an edge.  
The argument, which dates back to Gibbon, has been formulated most cogently by Paul 
Kennedy, who points to Europe’s competitive markets and persistent military rivalries.  
While military rivalry created an arms race, competitive markets encouraged military 
innovation and kept one country from establishing an empire.10  That would explain why 
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the military sector in early modern Europe turns out to have experienced rapid and 
sustained  productivity growth—an outcome unknown in other parts of the economy.11 
 Competition, however, is not the final answer.  Although it is a first step in the 
right direction, there is more that needs to be explained.  First of all, competitive markets 
do not always stimulate innovation.  The clearest example comes from agriculture in 
early modern Europe, which had highly competitive markets but witnessed virtually no 
productivity growth.12  What kept early modern European farmers from reaping the 
productivity gains of soldiers and sailors? 
Nor do ongoing military rivalries always stimulate innovation.  They in fact failed 
to do so in eighteenth-century south and southeast Asia, and in nineteenth-century Latin 
America too.  The case of India, as we shall see, is particularly illuminating, for like 
Europe it had markets and incessant warfare, and the combatants were quick to adopt the 
latest weapons and tactics.  The innovations, however, by and large originated elsewhere. 
The answer to this conundrum lies with the peculiar form of competition that 
European rulers were engaged in up until 1815.  It was not the garden variety economic 
competition that prevails among small entrepreneurs who maximize profits and at least in 
theory pay no attention to other firms.  Rather, it was political competition in what 
economists would call a tournament.  Competitors in a tournament—in contrast to the 
idealized small entrepreneurs—must pay attention to one another, because their relative 
standing determines who wins a single prize.  And doing worse does not simply reduce 
their profits, as with entrepreneurs; rather, it means they win nothing at all. 
A tournament of this sort had long engaged the monarchs of Europe, and 
tournaments among rulers existed in other parts of the world as well.  Under the right 
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conditions, they spurred rulers to improve military technology in the broadest sense of the 
word, even at the expense of the rest of the economy.  In early modern Europe,  the 
conditions were conducive to advances in military productivity. Elsewhere, however, 
they were not.  Understanding why requires a look at the political, military, and fiscal 
incentives rulers faced, both in Europe and in other parts of Eurasia.  It also requires a 
glance at the costs and benefits of other military technologies. 
 
1.  The tournament in Europe and its consequences 
 
 The states that coalesced in Europe in the waning days of the Middle Ages by and 
large had a single purpose, at least if we judge by what they levied taxes and borrowed 
money for.  That purpose was clearly warfare.  True, funds were spent on justice and 
palaces, and there was a pittance for transportation and famine relief.  But particularly in 
the major powers, some 40 to 80 percent of the budget went directly to the military, to 
defray the costs of armies and navies that fought almost without interruption (see Table 1 
for the frequency of battles).  The fraction of the budget devoted to war climbed even 
higher—to 95 percent in France during the 30 Years War—if we add sums spent 
subsidizing allies or paying of the debts of past wars.13 
 In early modern Europe, decisions about war typically lay in the hands of a ruler 
such as a king or a prince.  He would of course be advised by councilors, and an 
influential minister (a Richelieu or Olivares) might sometimes be dictating most of the 
decisions.  But the assumption that a king or  prince made the decisions about war is not 
far from historical reality.  Even in eighteenth-century Britain, where Parliament and the 
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cabinet decided whether to commence hostilities, the choices about the conduct of the 
war once it had begun were up to the king.14 
 What then made European kings take up arms?  That question has to be answered 
if we are to understand what the tournament was.  In Europe’s major powers, the rulers 
often won control of warfare in the process of assembling their states in the late Middle 
Ages or the sixteenth century.  They might have constructed their states by defeating 
domestic and foreign rivals, but typically they offered even conquered provinces 
protection from foreign enemies, in return for tax revenue.  In modern terms, one would 
say that they provided the public good of defense in return for taxes. 
 That public good was precious, as anyone who suffered through the horrors of the 
100 Years War in France or the 30 Years War in central Europe could testify.  But the 
rulers of early modern Europe likely provided far more defense than their average subject 
would have wanted.  The reasons were not hard to understand.  The kings and princes had 
been raised to fight one another, with toy soldiers, pikes, and firearms as children and 
actual training in their youth.  Advisers like Machiavelli might tell them that princes 
“ought to have no object, thought, or profession but war.”  Their own fathers would teach 
them that war was a path to glory, a means to “distinguish [kings] . . .  and to fulfill the 
great expectations ...inspired in the public,” in the words of Louis XIV’s instructions for 
his son.  They took the lesson to heart and once enthroned often surrounded themselves 
with images exalting their role as military leaders or glorifying the martial exploits of 
their reigns, as Louis XIV himself did at Versailles.  And they pursued war with gusto, at 
least if they ruled over a major power.  Fighting had gone beyond the needs of defense 
and become, in the words of Galileo, a “royal sport.”15 
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 Glory did recede as a motive for war in the eighteenth century, when the major 
powers might fight simply to preserve their reputation, to gain commercial advantage, or 
to snatch territory from weaker neighbors.  But war was still “what rulers did,” the 
normal target for their ambitions.  It continued to appeal to them, just as it long had 
attracted much of the European aristocracy.16 
For the major monarchs of early modern Europe, victory was thus a source of 
glory or a way to enhance their reputation.  They could gain smaller amounts of prestige 
by fighting, or even by raising a large army.  Grabbing territory from small neighbors 
would add to their standing and augment their resources.  And whatever the outcome 
was, they faced little risk to their thrones, at least in the larger states.  Smaller 
principalities might be swallowed up if defeated, but for western Europe’s bigger powers, 
loss in battle in anything but a civil war never toppled a monarch from his throne, at least 
in the years 1500-1799 (Table 2).17  Nor did warfare threaten Europe’s kings and princes 
with personal financial ruin, for the funds to pay for war by and large came from tax 
revenues, not from the rulers’ own possessions.  Although they might worry about tax 
revolts, the negotiations that went into to the construction of the larger European states 
insulated powerful elites from many of the tax increases.  Without backing from the 
elites, the revolts were less of a threat.18 
 Europe’s major monarchs thus had every reason to fight and even stronger 
reasons to outdo their neighbors and win victories.  They would have an incentive to vie 
with one another for a prize that would go to the winner and they would really exert 
themselves, because victory would depend on beating or outlasting their enemies.  Of 
course not all rulers would participate.  Some countries would be too small, and others 
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(the Netherlands in the eighteenth century, for example), though big enough to fight, 
would bow out, or at least not enter a particular war. 
Such a contest is an example of the economists’ tournament.  Potential contestants 
can choose whether or not to join in, and the reward that motivates them depends on their 
relative performance.  To win the prize, they exert effort, which may be harder or more 
costly for some potential entrants than others.  If the reward is large,  the effort elicited 
can be huge, particularly if the number of contestants who enter is not too large. 
This sort of tournament is what drives top notch athletes, such as a talented 
baseball player, to extreme measures in the quest for success.  The prize the baseball 
player seeks is a professional career, and victory  depends on whether he is better—even 
by only a slight amount—than other players.  He is therefore likely to go to extremes—
such as taking drugs that may harm him later in life—just to get that slight margin of 
victory.  A tournament, it has been argued, is also what justifies the pay of corporate 
CEOs.  Their huge compensation packages are the prize that motivates executives below 
them to push themselves in the hope of someday becoming CEO’s themselves.  
Tournaments are also used to promote research and improve technology.  The defense 
department has in fact run tournaments to choose whether Lockheed or Northrop would 
develop an improved jet fighter, and it has sponsored a recent one to support research on 
robotic vehicles.19 
Here skeptics may complain that the notion of a tournament really adds little and 
that it seems little more than a complex label stuck on the older and altogether adequate 
idea of competition.  Yet a closer look at the features of tournaments should help put that 
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objection to rest, particularly if we look more closely at the tournament in early modern 
Europe and compare it with military rivalries elsewhere in the world. 
To begin with, there is one feature of tournaments that clearly distinguishes them 
from garden variety economic competition, as we can see by varying the number of 
entrants who compete.  In a tournament, if only one competitor enters—one prince, for 
instance, in early modern Europe—he will exert no effort.  He does not have to, because 
his prize is guaranteed.  In a market, by contrast, a single entrant, such as the lone firm 
making a product, may well exert itself, because it can sell goods at a monopoly price.  
The monopoly rights may in fact give the firm a powerful incentive to do research that 
will make its monopoly even more valuable.  A single competitor in a tournament would 
never behave that way. 
Other differences emerge as the number of competitors grows.  In a market, 
competition increases with the number of entrants, but that need not be so in a 
tournament.  Indeed, under certain conditions, the total effort expended may even fall as 
the number of entrants rises above two, for the odds of winning fall, which reduces the 
expected value of any prize.  Someone who designs a tournament can in fact usually 
achieve any desired level of effort at lowest cost in term of the prize that has to be offered 
simply by limiting entry to two competitors.20 
That is how many competitors the tournament in early modern Europe often had, 
particularly if we take into account the alliances between countries.  The Hapsburgs 
battled the kings of France in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the English 
fought French in the eighteenth.  Other sizeable powers—the Swedes and the Dutch—
dropped out, while smaller countries simply did not participate, except perhaps as allies.  
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The number of rivals who actually entered the tournament was thus small enough to keep 
them from getting discouraged, and inducing them to expend effort did not require an 
outsized prize, at least if its value is measured relative to the costs of joining in, which 
would include the political and financial expenses involved in setting up armies, navies, 
and fiscal systems. 
What did all this effort go for?  It went to fund larger armies and navies and to 
improve tactics, logistics, and military technology.  Gunpowder weapons required 
centralized revenue and expenditure, particularly as armies and navies swelled and the 
technology improved.  In an era before nationalism motivated troops, armies had to be 
centralized, for if soldiers (many of whom were mercenaries) were scattered across a 
country, desertions would soar.  The cost of shipping supplies to the infantry also 
encouraged the centralization of armies, and it had a similar effect on navies.  Countries 
that could organize more effective provisioning could prevent mutinies and desertions 
and retain the loyalty of veteran troops, who often provided the margin of victory.21  As 
for navies, they needed suitable ports, meaning ones which could easily be defended and 
which, at least by the eighteenth century, would be deep enough for ships of the line.  The 
scarcity of such harbors also favored centralization.22  Fortifications had the same effect.  
It was extraordinarily expensive to build them large enough to house a defensive battery 
of cannons and strong enough to stand up under an siege, and their design required the 
expertise of skilled military architects.  The cost put them out of reach for small 
principalities and limited the number that could be constructed.  Even in large kingdoms 
the money devoted to fortifications had to be allocated carefully, so as to protect 
frontiers, key passes, and vulnerable cities.23 
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The clearest mark of all this effort was huge great increase in the tax revenues that 
central governments collected, at least among the major powers.  For France and 
England, where fiscal records begin early, the per capita tax burden (measured in grams 
of silver) rose over 6-fold between the 1540s and the 1780s (Table 3).  Picking other 
decades or measuring per-capita taxes in grain or days of a workman’s labor would not 
change the results appreciably.  By the eighteenth century, France may have been 
spending 5 to 10 percent of its GDP on military, and Great Britain even more—perhaps 
as much as 28 percent.24  For countries that were still poor by modern standards, these 
figures are quite high.  For comparison, at the end of the Cold War, the United States was 
spending 5 percent of its GDP on the military, and the USSR perhaps 10 percent.25 
Here one might object that raising taxes would take no effort at all, at least in 
absolute monarchies like France and Spain.  But even under absolutism taxes were 
limited by the concessions made to elites when kingdoms were assembled.  The kings of 
France and Spain could not simply raise taxes at will without provoking elite resistance, 
particularly in provinces that had joined the kingdom late.  The monarchs had to 
negotiate, offer additional privileges and liberties, or simply go without added revenue.  
Outside of Britain, which was far ahead of the rest western Europe, it would take the even 
greater efforts of centralization during the Napoleonic Wars (and the creation of national 
representative institutions in the nineteenth century) before the constraints on tax 
revenues were finally relaxed.26 
Rulers also strived to improve military technology, in the broad sense of the term: 
not just the design and manufacture of ships and weapons, but tactics, logistics, and 
training too.  In the sixteenth century, King Philip II of Spain hired away talented military 
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architects from Italy and gunners from Flanders, France, and Germany.  He also rewarded 
military inventors and established academies to train military engineers.   Two centuries 
later, the French were subsidizing the British iron master William Wilkinson in an effort 
to acquire British technology for manufacturing cannons.27 
These efforts helped spread the best military technology.  So did widespread 
espionage and states’ efforts to copy what was successful.28  Yet the technology would 
have spread even if states had not sought to imitate their rivals and hire away talent, via 
Europe’s long established market for military goods and skills.  Officers and professional 
soldiers had long been able to hire themselves out and even switch sides, with Wilkinson 
being far from the first entrepreneur who helped spread new techniques of making 
weapons.29  Efforts to interfere with the market usually failed: the Habsburg Emperor 
Charles V, for example, could not stop gunsmiths in Nürnberg from selling handguns to 
his enemies the French.  Assistance to allies was another major channel for the diffusion 
of technology.  Sweden’s King Gustavus Adolphus, for instance, trained with the Dutch 
and then improved upon the infantry tactics (such as volley fire) that they had 
pioneered.30 
Better technology did not spread overnight—otherwise no ruler would have had 
an incentive to innovate—but it did eventually diffuse among the military powers and 
keep any one of them from gaining a monopoly on military strength.  The effect was to 
make the European tournament work almost like an idealized prize system that put 
winning ideas into the public domain.  Rulers of major powers had every reason to 
improve their militaries, because wanted the glory, renown, or added territory that came 
with victory, but they would be less likely to pile triumph upon triumph and come to 
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dominate the entire continent or even put an end to the tournament itself.  Competitors 
would thus begin each new tournament with roughly the same improved technology and 
the same impetus to push it even further.31   
We can actually measure the rate at which military technology was improving,  in 
the same way that we can gauge the productivity of modern workers and industries.  The 
yardsticks used are perhaps crude and fail to capture advances in tactics or provisioning 
that were an integral part of the gunpowder technology.  They also have trouble with 
naval warfare, where western Europe’s lead was perhaps greatest.  The reason, beyond 
the scarcity of quantitative data for early navies, is simply that warships had variety of 
different goals, which varied over time.  Firepower dominated the eighteenth century, but 
speed, range, and an ability to fight in inclement weather were also important, 
particularly in wars of economic attrition that were focus of earlier warfare at sea.32  
Yet despite all these difficulties, the evidence that military productivity was 
advancing in early modern Europe is clear.  Captains in the British navy, for example, 
learned how to became much more effective fighters, which drastically cut their fatality 
rate.  If one holds constant the intensity and amount of fighting the captains were exposed 
to, their odds of dying in typical five year period fell from 16 percent in 1670-90 to one 
in a thousand in 1790-1810.33   On land, the effective firing rate per French infantryman 
jumped by a factor of 6 or more between 1600 and 1750, as bayonets made it possible to 
replace pike men and matchlocks were supplanted by flintlocks with ramrods and paper 
cartridges (Table 4).  The higher firing rate translated into labor productivity growth of 
1.3 to 1.7 percent per year, which rivals what developed countries experienced in the late 
twentieth century and far exceeds what one would expect for preindustrial economies. 
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Yet another sign of rapid productivity growth was falling price of weapons, which 
dropped faster than the cost of factors of production or of other manufactured goods 
(Figure 1).34  Like modern computer manufacturers, the gunsmiths of late medieval and 
early modern Europe were growing more effective at making weapons, and as in modern 
industries the productivity growth was particularly rapid when new weapons were first 
introduced.  When the first handguns appeared on the scene circa 1400 (they were little 
more than tiny, hand held cannons that could be fired from atop a city’s walls), the metal 
founders who cast them reduce the price drastically.35  They did so by cutting the amount 
of copper they used, so that the weight of the cannons dropped (Figure 2).  That may 
seem obvious to us, but in an era when cannons regularly exploded (Figure 3), it marked 
real progress. 
Rising productivity is what would be expected from a tournament, if the prize was 
high, if the number of contestants was small—but greater than one—and if the 
technology was one that made innovation economically and technologically feasible.  
Those were precisely the conditions prevailing among the major powers in early modern 
Europe.  The gunpowder technology did in fact allow for many improvements, not just to 
ships and weapons, but to tactics, organization, and provisioning.  The growth of per-
capita taxation would also be expected under these conditions, because it would be 
evidence of the enormous effort the tournament elicited.  By contrast, productivity 
growth is not what we would expect from competitive markets in early modern Europe.  
The continent had many such markets, but in large ones, such as the military sector, 
productivity growth was non existent.  The evidence thus seems consistent with a story of 
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a tournament with conditions favorable to military innovation.  But what about the rest of 
the world?  Does the same story work elsewhere? 
 
2.  Comparison with the Rest of the World 
 
 If the story about the tournament is correct, then it should explain why Europe 
gained a comparative advantage in the technology of artillery, firearms, fortifications, and 
armed ships.  In particular, it should help explain why Japan, China, and the Ottoman 
Empire eventually fell behind in the use of the gunpowder technology.  Presumably, 
either they did not have a tournament, or if they did, the conditions were not the same as 
in Europe. 
 The case of Japan is perhaps clearest.  After firearms were introduced there in 
1543, battling warlords and their opponents swiftly became experts in their manufacture 
and use.  They deployed them in virtually constant warfare that wracked the fragmented 
country, and they innovated, just as in Europe.  Not only were the Japanese the first to 
use volley fire, but they too devised fortifications that could resist artillery siege.  And as 
in Europe, the ability to mobilize resources and provision armies effectively proved 
critical with this technology.  The military innovations ground to a halt, though, after 
country was unified in the late sixteenth century.36 
 It all sounds reminiscent of the tournament in Europe.  As long as the civil war 
continued, the warlords and the other combatants would have powerful reasons to 
improve the technology, so long as there were not too many rivals involved.  But once the 
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country was unified, the tournament would be left with only one contestant, and the 
incentive to advance the technology would disappeared. 
 What about China and the Ottoman Empire?  Before we consider them, it worth 
noting that gunpowder was not the only military technology and that it would actually be 
ineffective against certain enemies.  China, for instance, faced attacks by nomads on 
horseback, and against them, artillery and handguns were of little use.  The nomads were 
too mobile for artillery and had no cities to besiege.  Sending the infantry chasing after 
them would demand too many provisions, since the nomads could simply ride off into the 
steppes and live off the land.  The best thing to do would be to fight them with cavalry 
armed with bows and swords, the same weapons the nomads utilized.  Muskets gave no 
advantage, because they could not easily be fired from horseback, and while pistols 
could, their range was limited.  Centralized provisioning and tax collection, which was 
crucial with gunpowder technology, might also prove ineffective.  It might simply be 
better to have soldiers settle near the frontier regions where the nomads were most likely 
to attack.  They could make some of their own equipment and grow some of their own 
food.  Such a strategy of partial military decentralization was in fact pursued early in the 
Ming dynasty.37 
The other major threat to Chinese emperors was rebellion, but rebels, at least if 
they were peasants, would be less likely to use firearms, because the private production 
and ownership of guns was limited in China.38 In sum then, the military dangers facing 
China made the gunpowder technology less attractive, although its appeal increased at the 
end of the Ming dynasty, when something like an arms race began to develop in east 
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Asia.39  And the technology that was preferable, particularly against the nomads—bows 
and swords—may have simply ruled out much innovation. 
Efforts to advance military technology of any sort may have also been hampered 
by a belief that the emperors of China should focus on peace and use force as a “last 
resort.”  Such a political norm, which may have been particularly strong under the late 
Ming, would have lowered the value of the prize if China ever were engaged in a 
tournament and it might have deterred the emperors from chasing conquests.40  
Europeans who knew China well would likely agree here.  One of them–the Jesuit 
missionary Matteo Ricci, who died in Peking in 1610 after spending 28 years in China–
noted that although the China could easily conquer neighboring states neither the 
emperors nor Chinese officials had any interest in doing so.  “Certainly, this is very 
different from our own countries [in Europe],” he noted, for European kings are “driven 
by the insatiable desire to extend their dominions.”41 
 One other factor may have also worked against military innovation in China, no 
matter what the technology: the size and durable unity of the empire.  For nearly three 
quarters of the two millennia between 221 BC and the nineteenth century, the Chinese 
Empire was intact; western Europe, by contrast, spent much more time fragmented into 
warring states.  Indeed, after the fall of the Roman Empire, western Europe knew only 
two short lived empires (the Carolingian and the Napoleonic), and it thus lived through a 
millennium and a half of nearly uninterrupted disunity.  More often than not China was 
thus in a situation like Japan after it was unified under the Tokugawa Shogunate: even if 
the Chinese emperors had wanted to compete in a military tournament, they would be the 
lone competitors and have no reason to exert any effort.  The only exception would  be 
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when the empire happened to be at war or was fragmented into hostile powers.  Then 
public defense might have created incentives for innovation, or China might have been 
going through something like early modern Europe’s tournament, and we would expect 
to see military innovations, though not necessarily with the gunpowder technology. 
 There is one final condition that may have kept the Chinese from pushing the 
gunpowder technology.  When this technology finally became appealing in the 
seventeenth century, it may simply have been more advantageous to acquire it from the 
Europeans, by asking the Portuguese (or the Jesuits) to provide designs and expertise.42  
The European rulers, after all, had already been through a tournament.  They had paid the 
costs of entering the tournament and expended a great deal of effort to improve the 
gunpowder technology.  The resulting innovations were now part of the public domain or 
offered for sale at competitive prices.  Why should a Chinese Emperor pay the same 
entrance fees and duplicate the Europeans’ efforts, when it might be cheaper simply to 
buy the European innovations by hiring European experts?43 
Quantitative evidence bears out these claims about China.  The Chinese did invent 
a large number of weapons—more than just gunpowder and firearms—and not 
surprisingly the discoveries tended to be made when emperors were at war.44  But over 
the years 1500-1799, China was less likely than major European powers to be fighting 
foreign enemies against whom gunpowder weapons might prove useful.  It was less likely 
to be battling foreign enemies overall, and most of the hostilities involved civil wars or 
nomads, which left little room for innovation.  If these two sorts of strife are set aside, the 
contrast with major European powers is striking (Table 5).   So at the very time when 
gunpowder technology was advancing, China’s rulers had less reason to cultivate the new 
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weapons, and the Chinese military had much less experience with them.  Greater 
experience could of course translate into learning how to improve the technology, as with 
British naval captains. 
The Chinese emperors also seem to have done less to raise and centralize taxation, 
as would be expected if the gunpowder technology was not the focus of their efforts.  The 
central government’s per capita tax receipts (measured in grams of silver) in fact turn out 
to have been much lower in China in the years 1520-1630 than in England or France 
(Figure 4).  One could argue that part of difference was due to the relative price of silver 
in China, where silver was dear relative to gold, but converting to gold would multiply 
the Chinese figures by a factor of at most 2 relative to Europe, which does not eliminate 
the enormous difference.  True, some of Chinese figures come from the waning days of 
Ming dynasty, but the much higher numbers in Europe are a mark of the enormous effort 
that the tournament there elicited.  Conditions in China were different, and the Ming 
Emperors therefore had no reason to squeeze taxpayers so hard, even when the Empire 
was at war.  Fighting the nomads did not hinge on centralizing the provisioning system, 
and raising taxes always risked rebellion. 
 A similar argument might fit the Ottoman Empire, which had to confront both 
nomads and enemies who employed the gunpowder technology.  The Ottomans could 
therefore not devote all their resources to gunpowder, as the Europeans could, and it is 
perhaps not a surprise that the central government’s tax receipts failed to keep up 
collections in Europe.45  Nor is it startling that their conquests tended to shift toward the 
east.  To the west, they faced European powers whose militaries could specialize in the 
gunpowder technology and whose armies and navies were growing stronger, thanks to a 
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tournament operating under the right conditions.  Eventually the Ottomans began to 
import weapons and expertise from the Europeans.46  For them too, the conditions were 
not as auspicious as in Europe, and in particular, it was not worth their while to pay the 
costs of innovation when they too, like the Chinese, could import it when needed from 
the West. 
 The most telling comparison, however, is between Europe and India, which 
should have been fertile ground for advances in gunpowder technology, if the traditional 
argument about competition were correct.  India witnessed virtually constant warfare and 
had highly developed markets for military goods and services.47  The claims about 
competition would predict that Indians would therefore push the gunpowder technology 
further, yet while they readily adopted new weapons and tactics, they did not break new 
ground in their use.  The innovations, by and large, came from the West with renegade 
experts and officers and imports of weapons.48  That runs counter to what the claims 
about competition would lead one to expect. 
 Part of the reason was that India, like the Ottoman Empire, had one foot in the 
nomadic zone.  For a long time, then, the gunpowder technology was little use, and 
armies were predominantly (though not exclusively) cavalry, particularly under the 
Mughal Empire.  But in eighteenth century, as the Mughal Empire disintegrated, the 
gunpowder technology became advantageous.  Yet even at that point the Indians failed to 
innovate.  Their highly developed military markets meant that they quickly embraced the 
latest that the gunpowder technology had to offer, but they did not push it further on their 
own.49 
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 The model of the tournament can explain why.  There was a military tournament 
in India, with political competition, but the conditions differed greatly from those in 
Europe and in fact worked against improvements to the gunpowder technology.  To begin 
with, there were simply too many competitors in India—too many entrants in the 
tournament.  One reason was that alliances were weak and allies often defected, leaving 
the Indian tournament with far more than the two rivals common in Europe.50  The 
contestants thus had less of an incentive to exert themselves and break new ground.  In 
addition, as with China, there was no point putting any effort into innovation if the 
Europeans had already made the advances.  Why pay the entry costs and duplicate their 
work?  It would be better simply to copy their technology and hire their experts. 
 Two other features of the Indian tournament—both absent in Europe—also 
hampered efforts to enhance the gunpowder technology.  It was common in Indian for 
strife to break out within families over succession to a throne or rights to rule.  Conflict of 
this sort, which had grown rare in Europe after the late Middle Ages, reduced the value of 
the prize in the Indian tournament, by raising the odds that a prince or other ruler would 
be unable to enjoy fruits of victory.  As a result, Indian rulers would exert less effort to 
improve weapons and tactics or centralize provisioning and taxation. 
 The political and economic costs of centralizing taxation and army funding may 
have also been higher in India.  It seems to have been easier for Indian military leaders 
and other members of the elite to defect and join the enemy.  Behavior of this sort was 
less common in Europe, particularly after the early seventeenth century.  Indian rulers 
might therefore have hesitated before raising or centralizing taxes out of fear that elites 
would jump ship.51  In addition, grain markets in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
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India were more fragmented than in Europe, which would make centralized provisioning 
and tax collection more difficult.52  In a tournament, all the higher political and economic 
costs would in turn mean less effort overall.53 
If we consider the most powerful successor states to the Mughal Empire, most of 
them did fail to develop to develop centralized tax and supply systems.  That is a telltale 
sign that the conditions in the Indian tournament were different, because advancing the 
gunpowder technology depended on centralizing the fisc and provisioning.  In this 
situation, the East India Company thus had an enormous advantage in India, even though 
it was only a private enterprise, because it could easily use its own financial system, 
which was already in place, to centralize the funding of war.  That advantage allowed it 
to conquer much of India, simply by hiring away the best officers and their troops.54 
 
3.  Conclusion  
 
  The idea of the tournament yields a deeper understanding of why Europeans 
pushed the gunpowder technology so far and why therefore they were the ones to conquer 
the world.  The rulers of western Europe’s major powers were competing in a 
tournament, under conditions that drove them to improve the artillery, firearms, 
fortifications, and armed ships that they deployed in their wars.  Since the gunpowder 
technology required it, they raised taxes and strove to centralize provisioning and the 
fiscal system. They overspent on the military and provided more defense than their 
subjects likely desired.  But they had little reason not to.  Victory in the tournament won 
them glory, enhanced reputations, and resources from territory snatched away from 
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smaller neighbors.  Losses never cost them their throne, at least for the major powers and 
as long as they faced no civil war.  Finally, they did not bear the full costs of warfare, and 
neither did elites with political voice, who in any case often aspired to military careers.55 
  The small number of contestants in Europe kept the level of effort high, in contrast 
to what happened in India’s tournament.  The economic and political costs of 
centralization were more favorable in Europe, while the value of the tournament prize 
was not diminished by frequent strife over succession.  And in Europe, the market for 
weapons and military skills helped prevent one country from getting too far ahead, 
although there was an important element of historical contingency involved.  Had one 
power crushed the others—the Habsburgs in the sixteenth century, or Napoleon at the 
height of his power—the tournament in Europe would have halted, as it did in early 
modern Japan.  But that never happened in Europe.  It never enjoyed the political unity 
that would have cut the incentives for military innovation, as in China or in Japan under 
the Tokugawa Shogunate. 
  Other factors were of course involved.  Against nomads, the gunpowder 
technology—and the centralized provisioning and tax collection that went with it—were 
of little use.  It therefore had limited appeal to Ottomans, and even less to the Chinese.  
But even here the tournament gives us insight.  When the technology finally did become 
attractive, as in eighteenth-century India and perhaps in seventeenth-century China too, it 
may have simply been cheaper to buy it from the Europeans.  Why the pay the cost of 
entering a tournament that would simply duplicate their efforts, when it would be so 
much easier to hire their experts and purchase their weapons? 
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  Although this argument may seem persuasive, there are still a number of questions 
that remain.  How do we explain the historical contingencies that brought a tournament to 
an end in Japan and kept it alive in Europe?  What role did relative prices of land and 
labor play, and how did they affect the political incentives for centralizing taxation and 
the provision of defense?  What accounts for the smaller number of competitors in 
Europe and ease with which alliances could be formed?  Did it derive from rules of 
succession, or perhaps from marriage practices, since matrimony often sealed alliances in 
Europe?  And did the actual operation of the tournament—with potential competitors 
having to pay the initial cost of establishing a standing army whether or not they later 
chose to fight—actually heighten the effort that they would later exert?  A more elaborate 
model of the tournament suggests as much.56 
  Finally, why did the rulers of early modern Europe face incentives that give them 
every reason to join the tournament and little reason to hold back?  Napoleon and the 
wars of French Revolution did finally overturn these rulers of the game: henceforth 
losing at war could cost the ruler of a major power his throne (Table 2).  Where did these 
ancient incentives originate and why did they finally change?  And what in turn were the 
political and economic consequences?  Far back into the Middle Ages, Europe had 
overspent on warfare, with disastrous consequences for the economy.  With a century of 
peace after 1815, did the continent reap any economic benefits?  Is it any surprise that the 
continent swiftly followed the British example and industrialized? 
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Table 1 
Frequency of War in Europe 
 
      
 
Period Average Percentage of 
Time Principal European 










Source:  (Wright 1942, 1: Tables 29, 45, 46);  (Levy 1983) leads to similar results. 
 
Note:  The principal European powers are defined as France, Austria, Great Britain, 
Russia, Prussia, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Turkey, and Poland. 
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Table 2   
 
Probability That a Major European Sovereign Was Deposed After Losing a Foreign War 
 
Fraction Deposed Because of Defeat in 
Each Year of War or in Each Year of 
War Loss 
Conditional on: 










Austrian Dominions 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.20
France 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.67
Great Britain 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hohenzollern Dominions 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.50
Spain 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.33
 
Source: (Langer 1968). 
 
Note: The calculation of the conditional probabilities begins with a count of sovereigns 
who were deposed after losing a foreign war for the Austrian Dominions, France, Great 
Britain, the Hohenzollern lands, and Spain.  The count includes any assassinations 
provoked by loss in a foreign war, but it excludes assassination or removal from office 
during civil wars and internal revolutions, unless the cause was the loss of a foreign war.  
In particular, the executions of king Charles I of England and Louis XVI of France are 
not counted, and the same holds for the removal of James II of England and the 
deposition of Ferdinand II in Bohemia in 1618.  The calculations also exclude the simple 
downfall of ministries. The number of deposed monarchs is then divided by the number 
of years the country was at war; that yields the probability of deposition after losing a 
foreign war conditional on being at war.  War here is defined as any class of armed 
conflict significant enough to be included in Langer; no formal declaration of war is 
necessary.  It includes colonial fighting, but it excludes civil wars unless foreign powers 
are involved.  The calculation of the probability of deposition conditional on losing a war 
is similar; the only difference is the number of deposed monarchs is divided by the 
number of years in which a war ended with a loss for the country concerned. Sovereigns 
included all monarchs, whether absolute or constitutional.  For republics, the sovereign 
was the parliament or legislative assemblies; if the legislative assemblies shared 
sovereignty with a president or other executive, then the sovereign was the executive and 
the legislative assemblies together. 
 The Austrian dominions exclude Habsburg territory in Iberian Peninsula, Italy, 
Low Countries, and Latin America.  Bohemia is excluded before Habsburgs assume the 
crown in 1526, and Hungary is not counted until it was fully integrated into the Habsburg 
holdings in 1699.  For France, the Convention is counted as a sovereign; Napoleon's 
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abdication in 1814 is counted as a removal after a loss, but not his second abdication after 
Waterloo.  For Great Britain, the calculation concerns England and Ireland alone up until 
1603; during the Protectorate, the Lord Protector is counted as sovereign. For Spain, 
depositions do not include loss of Portugal or of non-Iberian possessions. All the 
probabilities are ex-post, and they clearly make more sense for monarchies than for 
republics.  The table leaves out countries that were major powers at some point between 
1500 and 1800—Sweden and the Netherlands in the seventeenth century, and Russia in 




Central Government’s Per-Capita Tax Revenue, 1540s-1780s 
 
 
 Per-Capita Taxes (Grams of Silver) 
Country England/Great Britain France 
1540s 27.52 9.13 
1780s 171.69 68.86 
Increase 6.24 7.54 
 
Source:  For the French revenue and population figures, see (Hoffman and Norberg 1994, 
238-239) and the sources listed there.  For England (in the 1540s) and Great Britain (in 
the 1780s), the revenue figures come from data collected by P. K. O’Brien  and P. A. 
Hunt and posted at the European State Finance Data Base that Richard Bonney has 
assembled (http://www.le.ac.uk/hi/bon/ESFDB/dir.html); and from evidence gathered by 
Mark Dincecco and made available at the Global Price and Income Group web site at 
http://gpih.ucdavis.edu/ and in (Dincecco 2009).  The population figures are taken from 
(Wrigley, Schofield, Lee and Oeppen 1989, Table 7.8) for the 1540s and from 
Dincecco’s data for the 1780s.  The Global Price and Income web site is also the source 
of the silver conversions. 
 





Military Labor Productivity in the French Army: 
Rate of Successful Fire per Infantryman, 1600-1750  
 
Approximate Date 
Rate of Successful 









1600 (1620 for 
handguns per 
infantryman) 




1700 0.67 1.00 0.67 1 shot per minute 
with flintlock, 0.33 
misfire rate; 
bayonets have led 
to replacement of 
pike men. 
1750 1.33 1.00 1.33 2 shots per minute 
with flintlock, 




Source: (Lynn 1997, 457-460, 464-465, 469-472) 
 
Notes: The calculation considers only pike men and infantrymen with firearms; it ignores 
unarmed solders, such as drummers.  The implied rate of labor productivity growth over 
the 150 year period from 1600 to 1750 is between 1.3 and 1.7 percent per year. 
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Table 5:  Frequency of Foreign War in China and Europe, 1500-1799 
 
 
 Fraction of years at war against foreign enemies 
Country With wars against nomads Without wars against 
nomads 
China 0.31 0.08 
France 0.52 0.52 
England/Great Britain 0.53 0.53 
Spain 0.81 0.81 
Austrian dominions 0.24 0.24 
 
Source:  Micheal Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to 
Casualty and Other Figures,1500-2000 (McFarland &Company, 2002); Quincy Wright, 
A Study of War, 2 vols. (University of Chicago Press, 1942); Zhongguo Junshi Tongshi 
(Military History of China), vols. 15-17 (Junshi Kexue Press, 1998); Bai Shouyi, 
editor,vol.8-10, Zhongguo Tong Shi, vols. 8-10 (Shanghai People’s Press, 1999); Peter N. 
Stearns, The Encyclopedia of World History, page 376-381. 
 
Note: Austrian dominions and Spain as in Table 2.  The data for this table were collected 
by Margaret Chen, a graduate student in economics at UC Davis, for a comparative paper 









Figure 1:  The logarithm of the price of pistols over the price of spades in England.  
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Figure 2:  Logarithm of the Price and Weight of Early Handguns in Frankfurt.  Source: 



























Figure 3:  Warning of the danger that a cannon might explode, from an early fifteenth-





Figure 4: The central government’s per capita tax receipts in China, England, and France 















Source:  Data collected for a comparison of Europe and China by Margaret Chen and the 
author. 
 
Note: In the legend, China is represented by the bars labeled chinapctaxgmag, France by 
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